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Abstract 
This paper explores the role of mass media on people’s perceptions of charismatic leaders, 
focusing on Japan’s Koizumi regime. We conduct an empirical assessment, looking at the 
influence of television and newspapers on the support for Koizumi and his principal policy. 
This study uses individual-level data collected immediately after Koizumi’s 2005 landslide 
win. The major findings are: (1) frequency of exposure to mass media is positively related to 
support for Koizumi but not to support for his principal policy and (2) the effect of watching 
television is only observed for women and that of reading the newspaper only for men. Thus, a 
charismatic male leader on television has a greater influence than his policy on female voters. 
The psychological effect of an “attractive” male leader on female voters is amplified through 
television. Despite no support from special interest groups, Koizumi won the election because 
of a televised superstar effect.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Popularity appears to be one of the key determinants that increases market demand. In the 
entertainment or sports market, demand for superstars is far greater than that for others, 
resulting in a substantial gap of earnings between superstars and others. The theory of the 
superstar suggests that the star effect stems from huge amounts of consumption and imperfect 
substitution (Rosen 1981). Concerning high levels of consumption, the development of mass 
media such as television makes it possible for large numbers of people to find amusement in 
televised entertainment programs and sports games. Superstar effects are also thought to be 
observed in elections and play a key role in determining the winning regime. It is important for 
a political party to exploit the popularity its charismatic politicians with the aim of winning the 
election. In addition to policy and political belief, what makes a political superstar is the image 
transmitted via mass media to voters. Inevitably, in modern society, to win an election the 
leader of a political party has a significant incentive to plan a strategy to improve his/her image 
for the national audience.
1
  
If the mass media does indeed increase the superstar effect, then it is of value to explore the 
effect of the mass media on voters’ perceptions about political issues and politicians.2 Existing 
literature deals with the relation between media and politics. A number of relevant studies 
come from the United States. These include those that use historical data to suggest that larger 
relief funds are allocated in areas where higher shares of households have radios (Strömberg 
2004). Other research has focused not only on the exposure of the mass media but also its slant. 
The results show that neither right-leaning nor left-leaning newspapers influence readers’ 
political knowledge, stated opinions, and turnout. However, both newspaper types were found 
to increase readers’ support for the Democratic candidate (Gerber Karlan and Bergan 2009). It 
was also found that the introduction of the conservative Fox News Channel in 20% of US 
                                                   
1 It was found that better-looking people earn more than average-looking people 
(Hamermesh and Biddle 1994; Biddle and Hamermesh 1998). To take the example of 
sports, attractiveness, as measured by facial symmetry, leads to greater rewards even 
after controlling for player performance (Berri et al. 2011). 
2 There are also studies in the field of economics that examine the effect of television 
on individuals’ perceptions such as happiness (Frey et al. 2007; Bruni and Stanca 
2008). 
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towns led its viewers to vote conservative Republican (Della Vigna and Kaplan 2007). 
Spanish-language news program on television also contribute to substantially boost voter 
turnout (Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel 2009). Furthermore, researchers are increasingly 
investigating the mass media and its political influence in other countries such as Italy 
(Durante and Knight 2012; Sabatini 2012), Russia (White et al. 2005; Enikolopov et al. 2011), 
Mexico (Lawson and McCann 2005), India (Olken 2009),
3
 and Muslim countries (Gentzkow 
and Shapiro 2004). These studies tell that the mass media plays a critical role in forming trends 
in public opinion. 
Since the end of the 1980s, the mass media in Japan, especially television, has had a critical 
influence on politics; this has led the Japanese public to “consume” politics (Krauss and 
Nyblade 2005). In particular, Junichiro Koizumi, the prime minister from 2001 to 2006, is 
regarded as the most charismatic political leader in the last 25 years Japan. He is considered 
likeable and attractive; the New York Times have described Koizumi as Japan’s best-known 
Elvis impersonator (Stolberg and Dewan 2006). Koizumi also shares similarities with Ronald 
Reagan in that they both communicated with voters using a performance-based style and they 
aimed to reduce the size of government. Although it is not a good thing that politics has turned 
into something of a TV game show, Koizumi managed to take advantage of this style of 
television broadcasting and gained the support of the majority of voters (Ohtake 2003). As his 
principal policy, Koizumi called for the privatization of Japan’s postal services; this was 
opposed by many politicians (Imai 2009). Thus, he cleverly exploited the situation and came 
out the winner in the political world. Arguably, the case of a superstar in Japan’s political arena 
is useful to analyze how the superstar effect can secure electoral victory. 
The purpose of this paper is to assess how Koizumi gathered the support of voters by 
focusing on the mass media. More specifically, we examine how the frequency of watching 
television and that of reading newspapers influenced support for the Koizumi regime and its 
principal policy. This paper used individual-level data to conduct a statistical estimation. The 
data was compiled from the “Social and Political Consciousness Survey in 21st Century 
Japan” (GLOPE 2005 hereafter). The survey was conducted across Japan in 2005 immediately 
after the election to determine voters’ perceptions about politics at the time of the election. In 
this election, where Koizumi narrowed the electorate’s focus to postal privatization, the 
                                                   
3 Research related to media and economics issues has also been conducted based on 
cross-countries data (Djankov 2003; Connolly and Hargreaves Heap 2007; Petrova 
2008). 
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Koizumi regime won by a landslide.
4
 Therefore, the data certainly allows us to compare the 
determinants of support for Koizumi and those of his policy. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the background and an 
overview of the Koizumi regime. Furthermore, two testable hypotheses of citizens’ views 
towards the Koizumi regime and the main policy are also presented. Section 3 explains the 
dataset and provides a simple econometric framework to examine the hypotheses. In addition, 
estimation results are reported. The final section offers concluding remarks.   
 
2. The Setting and Hypotheses 
 
2.1. Overview of the Political Background  
Review of Japan’s Politics Post-World War II  
For more than 50 years since its founding (apart from two short periods in 1993–1994 and 
2009–2012) Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has been the dominant party within a 
democratic setting. Among the LDP prime ministers, Junichiro Koizumi is known as the most 
popular and was very supported by the people. Table 1 shows that from 1989–2012, Koizumi’s 
regime lasted for 60 months, which is clearly longer than any other regime (the second longest 
regime was that of Hashimoto at 30 months, half the length of Koizumi). The highest level of 
support during the Koizumi regime was 85%, which is the highest rate since 1989. In addition, 
the lowest support rate during the Koizumi regime was 39%, with only those of the Hosokawa 
and Hata regimes being higher. Considering the fact that the Hosokawa and Hata regimes were 
of only 8 and 2 months duration, respectively, the lowest support rate during the Koizumi 
regime is in fact very high compared with other regimes.
5
 To understand the reason why 
Koizumi garnered such high levels of support, it is necessary to discuss the political and 
economic background in Japan’s post-World War II period.  
The power groups within the LDP, known as factions (habatsu), are regarded as important 
when the dominance of the LDP is considered. The factions assume tasks in various areas, 
including candidate nomination, the acquisition of funds, and the allocation of party and 
government posts (Köllner 2006). Therefore, “the LDP’s institutionalized factional system 
served as an effective functional equivalent of formalized procedures and norms of party 
management…Informal rules on how party and cabinet posts were to be allocated made the 
                                                   
4 A significant relation between the result of the 2005 election in Japan and happiness 
was not observed (Tsutsui et al. 2010). 
5 The Hosokawa and Hata regimes were the first non-LDP regimes after World War II. 
They only received support for a very short period in 1993–1994.  
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political careers of LDP Diet members more foreseeable and helped to reduce uncertainty” 
(Köllner 2006, p.248). For a long time during the LDP’s ruling period, various factions formed 
links with special interest groups and industries, which are considered to play a key role in 
maintaining the LDP’s electoral dominance. For example, in Japan, politicians sometimes 
increase the expenditure allocated to public works in the hope that the construction industry 
will contribute to support election campaigns (Yamamura and Kondoh 2013). This is reflected 
in the fact that “larger amounts are spent on public works than in other countries, controlling 
for size and population” (Doi and Ihori 2009, p.181). There are also the LDP’s influential 
members of the Diet who are on committees called “policy tribes” (zoku-giin). They hand out 
political favors to those groups that support them in an election.
6
 In turns, thanks to the strong 
electoral support from these groups,  the LDP did not share its political power with any other 
parties until the early 1990s.  
In the early 1990s, the political power and stability of the LDP declined as a consequence of 
the serious corruption scandals that damaged the party. In response, members left the LDP and 
founded new parties that entered into coalitions with existing parties. Eventually, a seven-party 
coalition seized power for just 10 months (the equivalent duration to the Hosokawa and Hata 
regimes). The LDP then formed an alliance with the socialist party to come back into power. 
Since that time, the LDP has had to share power with other parties to ensure their political 
position in Japan. With respect to the economic situation, Japan has experienced long-term 
economic stagnation since the end of the “bubble economy” in the beginning of 1990s. In 
tandem, the political mechanism to maintain the dominance of the LDP failed to function well. 
The traditional political influence of special interest groups (with largely rural members) 
declined and the mobilizing of unaffiliated voters (who were mainly urban residents) became 
very important. Thus, the LDP was at the serious turning point in the beginning of new 
millennium. 
 
The Koizumi Regime and the Elections  
In 2001, Koizumi rose to the top of the governing LDP by exploiting his bad-boy image 
within a political organization whose rank-and-file members were longing for a plain-spoken 
leader with charisma and a vision of a new Japan. Koizumi pledged to scrap political 
convention, appointing cabinet members based on expertise and merit rather than on which 
faction of the party they belonged to (Strom 2001). Koizumi belonged to the Fukuda group, 
which is regarded as being outside the mainstream LDP. Hence, Koizumi did not enjoy any 
great benefit from the LDP’s institutionalized factional system, and it was this that provided 
                                                   
6 The cozy relationships among politicians, bureaucrats, and industry are sometimes 
described as an “iron triangle” (Sakakibara 2003). 
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him with the motivation for political reform. To survive in the political world, it was important 
for him to utilize the media to capture the floating vote. “Koizumi managed to capture the 
imagination of the Japanese public by means of snappy slogans and dramatizing politics. What 
set Koizumi apart from most former LDP leaders was that he appealed directly to public” 
(Köllner 2006, p.251). For the purpose of revitalizing the Japanese economy, Koizumi aimed 
to execute structural economic reforms to reduce wasteful public spending on infrastructure 
projects and to privatize the postal service. Supporters of the LDP were roughly divided into 
those who would benefit from reform and those who would be hurt by it. “Koizumi came to 
paper via a revolt by the LDP’s grassroots urban machine against the more rural-oriented party 
leadership” (Katz 2001, p.38). Koizumi “demonstrated an uncanny ability to instrumentalize 
the media, both old and new. Electoral cooperation with the New Komei party progress quite 
smoothly under Koizumi, contributing to the parliamentary dominance of the LDP” (Köllner 
2006, p.254). 
In 2005, the privatization of the postal service, which is considered Koizumi’s principal 
policy, was strongly opposed, not only members of the opposition party but also by many 
members of the LDP. Inevitably, the bill to privatize the postal service was rejected in the 
House of Councilors in August 2005. Thus, the rebellion of his own party members essentially 
prevented Koizumi’s principal policy from being realized. In response, Koizumi instantly 
dissolved the House of Representatives and conducted a general election to seek the public’s 
opinion on the bill. Therefore, a key issue of the general election was to determine whether the 
Japanese people agreed with the privatization of the postal service. In other words, Koizumi 
framed the election as a referendum on the privatization of the postal service.  
During the election, Koizumi made good use of the mass media, especially television, to 
describe himself as the hero of the reform and his opponents within the LDP as “resistance 
forces” stuck in the past (Köllner 2006). Koizumi brought further drama to the election by 
recruiting so-called “assassin” candidates to stand against LDP members who did not endorse 
the bill. He clearly and quite simply highlighted the confrontational relationship between 
himself and his opponents. Koizumi helped to transform politics into something of a TV game 
show, encouraging voters to enjoy politics as they would sports or or movie (Ohtake 2003). 
Without a doubt, within the colorful drama, Koizumi was cast as the leading man. The viewing 
audience increased remarkably because of such a carefully staged event, leading the broadcast 
station to treat the campaign as political entertainment. Koizumi’s strategy to exploit the mass 
media was a very effective one, as it even caught the attention of those who were usually 
disinterested. It got people involved in politics and as a result they voted for the LDP in the 
election (Köllner 2006). Mass media induced floating or unaffiliated voters in urban areas to 
support Koizumi’s principal policy. Where special interest groups and factions declined, “the 
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personalization of the role (of the prime minister) is increasingly important to voters…Skillful 
and attractive prime ministers will gain popularity and better results for their party; unskillful 
and unattractive ones will find their terms quite short” (Krauss 2002, p.12). 
In Japan, newspapers can be roughly divided into two categories. There are national 
newspapers such as Asahi, Yomiuri, and Mainichi, and these are distributed throughout Japan. 
There are also many local newspapers. Generally, the readers of the former are far greater in 
number than that of the latter. For instance, in 2010, the circulation of Yomiuri was 10 million, 
and that of Asahi was 7.9 millions. To put it into context, the circulation of the Wall Street 
Journal and USA Today in the United States is 2.0 million and 1.8 million, respectively.
7
 This 
suggests that newspapers are widely circulated in Japan compared with other developed 
countries.
8
 Concerning television in Japan in 2005, 99.3% of households had a television;
9
 
that is, most people had easy access to television viewing. Therefore, considering newspaper 
and television together during the Koizumi regime, the Japanese people were most likely 
exposed to both mediums.
10
 Accordingly, in the 2005 general election, Koizumi’s actions 
                                                   
7 The circulation of the New York Times is only 0.9 million even though since the late 
1990s its circulation has grown and local newspaper circulation has declined (George 
and Waldfogel 2006). 
8 Data source is “Circulation Data For National Newspaper”, which is available on the 
website of The International Federation of Audit Bureaux of Circulations (IFABC): 
http://www.ifabc.org/resources/data-reports%2065/data-reports-65 (Accessed on May 
6, 2014).  
9 Data source is “Consumer Confidence Survey”, which is available on the website of 
the Cabinet Office, Government of Japan: 
http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/stat/shouhi/shouhi.html (accessed on May 7, 2014). 
10 Based on cross-country data, the government ownership of mass media is observed 
to undermine political and economic freedom (Djankov 2003). In Italy, as prime 
minister, Berlusconi indirectly controls Italian public service television. Sabatini 
(2012) provides evidence that through the influence of Berlusconi’s media power, 
support for him persists despite of his various misconduct. In Japan, there is only one 
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resulted in the dramatization of the election and his landslide win. 
 
2.3.Empirical Hypotheses  
Gentzkov (2006) describes the introduction of television in the 1950s as a dramatic 
improvement of the previous entertainment technologies. Accordingly, the price of political 
information reduced and there was a greater reduction in the price of entertainment. 
Consumers responded by moving away from the former and toward the latter. However, the 
fact that Koizumi acted to dramatize politics suggests that television possibly broadcasted both 
political news and entertainment together. This is evident by the fact that “by collecting news 
and combining it with entertainment, media are able to inform passive voters about regulation 
and other public policy issues, acting as a (partial) counterbalance to small but well organized 
groups ” (Dyck et al. 2013, p.521).  
However, attention is called for when considering the possibility that the influence of mass 
media causes people to be more interested with the characteristics of political leaders than with 
policy issues. This result would act as a counterbalance to special interest groups. A similar 
example can be seen in the relationship between a film and the leading actor. Fans of Tom 
Hanks go to see a film with him in the main role because they want to see him in the film, even 
if they are not interested in the film itself. Similarly, when Ronald Regan came to power, it was 
more likely because he was well-known actor rather than specific policies or political 
philosophies. Therefore, to closely examine the argument of Dyck et al. (2013), it is essential 
to disentangle the popularity of a political leader from those policy issues to which special 
interest groups are opposed. Therefore, we propose the following two hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Through mass media, voters obtain information on policy issues and then 
support the policy that is against the interest of special interest groups. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Through mass media, voters are fascinated with the character of the political 
leader and then support his regime even if they are not interested in his principal policy, which 
is against the interest of special interest groups. 
 
On one occasion, Koizumi danced in his office with a visiting US film star, Richard Gere 
                                                                                                                                                     
public broadcasting agency, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK). Although 
Koizumi’s program obviously increased the television viewing audience, he did not 
build an empire of mass media like Berlusconi.  
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(who has been said to resemble him) (Van Gelder 2005). It is presumed that because news of 
this event was broadcast, Japanese fans of Gere would then like Koizumi even if they were 
indifferent to politics. The New York Times also reported an impressing episode in the United 
States showing how appealing Koizumi can be. In 2006 Koizumi visited the home of Elvis 
Presley with the then President Bush. Koizumi shares his birthday (Jan. 8) with Elvis Presley 
and it has been noted that their hairstyles are similar. Koizumi gave an Elvis Presley 
impression during the tour of Elvis’s home. When Elvis’s former wife pointed out a pair of 
oversized gold-rimmed sunglasses once worn by the King, the prime minister eagerly donned 
them, thrusting his hips and arms forward in imitation of a classic Elvis move. He later threw 
his arm around Elvis’s daughter, belting out some Elvis lyrics, “hold me close, hold me tight”. 
(Stolberg and Dewan 2006). Thus, Koizumi’s strikingly appealing characteristics and the fact 
that his policy was opposed by special interest groups are appropriate to test Hypotheses 1 and 
2.  
 
3. Estimated Model and Estimation Results  
 
3.1. Data  
This survey was purposefully conducted by GLOPE throughout Japan immediately after the 
2005 election to systematically investigate voters’ views on politics at that time. Sample points 
can be divided into cities (which are considered as urban areas) and towns or villages 
(considered as rural areas). Three thousand adults were invited to participate in the survey with 
stratified two-stage random sampling. The data includes various information on the Koizumi 
regime and his principal policy (postal service privatization), homeownership, schooling years, 
demographic (age and sex) status, and household income.
11
  
Information regarding the samples used in this research is shown in Table 2. The mean 
value of KOIZUMI (Koizumi supporter dummy) is 0.62, meaning that 62% people supported 
the Koizumi regime. This is consistent with the result of the election in 2005. The mean value 
of PRIVAT (postal privatization supporter dummy) is 0.42, suggesting that 42% people 
supported the privatization of Japan’s postal service. Hence, there is a 20% difference between 
them, showing that one-third of those who supported the Koizumi regime did not support the 
                                                   
11 Data for this secondary analysis were sourced from the “Social and Political 
Consciousness Survey in 21st Century Japan (GLOPE 2005)”. Data were collated by 
Waseda University Centre of Excellence Program for the 21st Century: Constructing 
Open Political-Economic Systems (21 COE-GLOPE). The research was subcontracted 
to Chuo Chosa-Sha. Data were provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, 
Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, 
The University of Tokyo. 
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principal policy of the Koizumi regime. This can be interpreted as implying that one-third of 
Koizumi supporters preferred his appealing personality but not his policy. In other words, 
people voted for the LDP and its candidates even though they paid little attention the issues in 
dispute. Figure 1(a) indicates that the frequency of watching television is not related to support 
for the Koizumi regime for men. However, Figure 1(b) suggests that the more frequently 
women watched television, the more likely they were to support the Koizumi regime. Neither 
Figure 2(a) nor Figure 2(b) reveal an association between the frequency of watching television 
and support for the privatization of postal service regardless of the respondents’ sex. These 
results indicate that television contributed to increasing in the number of women who 
supported the Koizumi regime, but not regarding his principal policy (which was a central 
issue in the general election). Turning to the effect of reading newspapers, the frequency of 
reading a newspaper is not related to support for the Koizumi regime and its policy at all (these 
results are not shown)
12
. All in all, these results are consistent with Hypothesis 2, but not with 
Hypothesis 1. To further scrutinize these findings, regression estimations were conducted and 
the results are discussed below. 
 
3.2. Empirical Model  
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, the estimated function takes the following form: 
Yi = 0 + 1 TVi + 2 NEWS i + 3 Ln(INCOM) i + 4 Ln(EDU) i  + 5 Ln(AGE) i + 5 
SPOUS i + 6 CHILD i + 7UNEMP i + 8 KNOW i + 9 GOVPT1 i + 10 GOVPT2 i + 
11VILLAG i + 12MAN i + ui , 
where Yi represents the dependent variable for an individual i such as KOIZUMI and PRIVAT. 
The error term is represented by ui. Because KOIZUMI and PRIVAT are dummy variables that 
are either 1 or 0, a probit model can be used. However, if a correlation exists between the 
residuals of different equations, then a bivariate probit model is more appropriate to conduct 
estimations of KOIZUMI and PRIVAT at the same time (Greene 2008). Furthermore, ’, as 
                                                   
12 Figures are available upon request from the corresponding author.  
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reported in Tables 3, 4, and 5, is the marginal effect.
13
  
If watching television and reading newspapers leads voters to support the Koizumi regime 
(the privatization of the postal service), the coefficients of TV and NEWS are expected to be 
positive when KOIZUMI (PRIVAT) is a dependent variable. The coefficients of TV and NEWS 
are positive in columns (2), (4), and (6) when Hypothesis 1 is supported. In contrast, the 
coefficients of TV and NEWS are positive in columns (1), (3), and (5) when Hypothesis 2 is 
supported. Newspapers can provide greater amounts and more detailed information about 
political issues than television; however, television was able to broadcast the Koizumi 
performance more vividly and visually than the newspapers. Because of the difference of the 
functions of television and newspaper, we can distinguish and compare the effects of mass 
media.  
To control for the economic condition of the respondents, the logs of household income level 
(INCOM), schooling years (EDU), age (AGE), and job status (UNEMP) are included as 
independent variables. Koizumi’s basic policy philosophy was based on a market mechanism 
to improve economic efficiency and therefore reduces the public sector, which is reflected in 
the privatization of the postal service. Owing to the reform, highly educated people are more 
                                                   
13 In a similar methodological framework, Sabatini (2013) uses an instrumental 
variable to control for endogeneity of trust for television for the determinants of trust 
in Berlusconi, the Italian prime minister. For the instrumental variables, Sabatini 
(2013) uses proxies of social capital such as the quality of friendships and trust in the 
press. Turning to the analysis in the present study, following Sabatini (2013), we 
conduct an IV probit estimation where TV (and NEWS) is treated as an endogenous 
variable and therefore use instruments such as degree of community participation 
regarded as a proxy for social capital. Results of the Wald test for the exogeneity of TV 
(and NEWS) are obtained. The test statistics are not significant, and thus there is 
insufficient evidence in the sample to reject the null-hypothesis that there is no 
endogeneity. This indicates that there is no need to use instrumental variables because 
endogeneity bias does not exist. Therefore, we do not report the results of the IV probit 
model although the results are similar to those reported in Tables 3–5. The results of 
the IV probit are available upon request from the corresponding author. 
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likely to have the opportunity to obtain high earnings. Therefore, EDU is predicted to be 
positive. In contrast, unemployed people are less likely to benefit from such a policy and so the 
coefficient of UNEMP is predicted to be negative. SPOUS (dummy for having a spouse) and 
CHILD (dummy for having a child) are incorporated to capture the family structure. KNOW 
(dummy to know about the Speaker of the House of Representatives in Japan) is included to 
capture the degree that respondents have a basic knowledge of Japan’s political situation. As 
mentioned in the previous section, the Koizumi regime was based on an alliance between the 
LDP and the new Komei party. The political standpoint of respondents is captured by GOVPT1 
(dummy for a supporter of the LDP) and GOVPT2 (dummy for a supporter of the new Komei 
party). There is the possibility of reverse causality between KOIZUMI and GOVPT1 (and 
GOVPT2), resulting in estimation bias. However, estimation results reported later do not 
change even when GOVPT1 and GOVPT2 are excluded from the set of independent variables. 
Traditionally, the LDP received support from voters in rural areas, however, the influence of 
urban residents (traditionally independent voters) also increased. As mentioned in section 2, 
Koizumi enjoyed greater support from urban residents than from rural ones. Hence, the 
coefficient of VILLAGE is predicted to be negative. Furthermore, females are thought to find 
Koizumi more appealing, and as such it is predicted that MAN will be negative.  
 
4. Estimation Results  
 
Table 3 reports the estimation results based on the whole sample. Tables 4 and 5 exhibit the 
results of men and women, respectively. The model used here is a bivariate probit model and 
thus the determinants of KOIZUMI and PRIVAT are estimated jointly. The results including 
those of the independent variables are exhibited jointly in columns (1) and (2). The correlation 
coefficient for TV and NEWS is 0.42 and statistically significant. Hence, collinearity may occur. 
To deal with this possibility, we also report alternative models where either TV or NEWS are 
omitted from the set of independent variables. Therefore, two sets of results for KOIZUMI and 
PRIVAT are presented in columns (3) and (4), and in columns (5) and (6).  
The results of the key variables (TV and NEWS) are shown in Table 3. As predicted for 
KOIZUMI, the coefficients of TV and NEWS are positive in columns (1), (3), and (5). 
KOIZUMI is statistically significant in columns (1) and (3) and NEWS is statistically 
significant in column (5) but not in column (1). Owing to the correlation between TV and 
NEWS, their standard errors increase in column (1). This might lead NEWS to be insignificant. 
In contrast, the results of TV do not change, showing that they are robust. In addition, the 
marginal effect of TV is larger than that of NEWS when KOIZUMI is the dependent variable. 
All in all, the effect of frequency of watching television on support for the Koizumi regime is 
 13 
 
more significant and greater than that of reading newspapers. Switching our attention to the 
results of PRIVAT, contrary to predictions, TV is negative in columns (2) and (4). As predicted, 
NEWS is positive in columns (1) and (6). Neither TV nor NEWS are statistically significant. 
Based on these results, the presence of mass media acted to increase voters’ support of the 
Koizumi regime. In contrast, TV and NEWS did not influence voters’ support of Koizumi’s 
principal policy, being a key issue in the 2005 general election. Hence, these results support 
Hypothesis 2 but not Hypothesis 1. 
Concerning the results of the control variables presented in Table 3, INCOM is positive in all 
columns. Furthermore, INCOM is statistically significant in the estimation of KOIZUMI, but 
not in that of PRIVAT. Therefore, people with high incomes are more likely to support the 
Koizumi regime. However, income level is not related to supporting the privatization of the 
postal service. As shown in columns (1), (3), and (5), the coefficient of EDU is negative, but is 
not statistically significant in the estimation of KOIZUMI. As is in columns (2), (4), and (6), 
EDU is positive and statistically significant in the estimation of PRIVAT. The results for EDU 
can be interpreted as follows. Educated people prefer market-oriented policies because they 
will benefit because of their education. However, education does not cause people to evaluate 
the appealing performance of Koizumi. As exhibited in columns (1), (3), and (5), AGE is 
negative while being statistically significant when determinants of KOIZUMI are estimated. 
This indicates that older people who are accustomed to more traditional Japanese values did 
not approve of Koizumi’s performance, being behavior that is not typically associated with 
politicians. With respect to family structure (SPOUS and CHILD), job status (UNEMP), and 
political knowledge (KNOW), their coefficients do not show statistical significance in any 
columns. Therefore, these factors are not related to voters’ support of Koizumi and his policy. 
One possible explanation for this result is that the effect of job status and political knowledge 
are absorbed by education level or income level. Consistent with the prediction, GOVPT1 is 
positive and statistically significant in all columns, which suggests that supporters of the LDP 
also tend to support Koizumi and his policy. The results of GOVPT2 are similar to those for 
GOVPT1, although it is not statistically significant in columns (2), (4), and (6). This reflects 
that the supporters of the new Komei party (allied with the LDP) are inclined to support the 
Koizumi regime rather than its specific policy. VILLAGE is negative in all columns and show 
statistical significance in columns (1), (3), and (5). This corroborates the argument that 
Koizumi was widely supported by floating voters mainly living in urban areas, but not by rural 
voters who were more likely to belong to some special interest groups in the agricultural sector 
(Miyake 1989). 
Tables 4 and 5 show the results for the key variables. In Table 4, the coefficients of TV and 
NEWS are positive in all columns. However, with the exception of NEWS in column (5), they 
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are not statistically significant. Thus, frequency of watching television is not associated with 
support from men for the Koizumi regime and his policy. Furthermore, the effect of frequency 
of reading newspapers is not robust for men. It follows then that the mass media failed to 
influence men’s views. Turning to Table 5, the coefficient of TV is positive and statistically 
significant in columns (1) and (3) and is negative and insignificant in columns (2) and (4). 
Furthermore, NEWS is not statistically significant in any columns. This implies that the 
frequency of watching television led women to prefer Koizumi but not his policy. In contrast, 
the frequency of reading newspapers did not affect women’s support for the regime and policy 
at all. It is interesting to observe that VILLAG fails to be statistically significant although it is 
negative, indicating no difference in support for Koizumi between rural and urban women. 
This is in line with the argument that Koizumi enjoyed widespread popularity and had support 
not only in urban areas but also in rural regions (Ohtake 2003, p.128–129).  
Summing up the estimated results of Tables (3)–(5), we arrive at the conclusion that taken 
together, the estimation results proposed in this section are congruent to and support 
reasonably well the two hypotheses stated in section 2. What is more, the images provided by 
the media, for example on television, resulted in women to support the the very appealing 
Prime Minister Koizumi, but did not influence support from men. That is, floating female 
voters were fascinated by Koizumi’s performance, but not by his policy reported by mass 
media. This finding is in line with the argument that Japanese people were indifferent to 
politics even directly after the general election in 2005 (Tsutui et al. 2010).  
Koizumi’s popularity is comparable to that of Ronald Reagan (Ohtake 2003, p.115-127). 
Before becoming the president of the United States, Ronald Reagan was an actor in Hollywood. 
Regan had the advantage of an acting career and was able to win the support of US voters. 
Derived from what is found in this paper, Koizumi strategically offered an appealing and 
attractive performance, thereby intensifying the political drama to attract floating female voters. 
Furthermore, he exploited television to win the election and maintain his political power even 
though Koizumi was not professional actor. Throughout the election campaign in 2005, 
Koizumi repeatedly and strongly promoted his policy using simple phrases such as “I aim for a 
small government”, “what can be done by the private sector should be done by the private 
sector”, and “I ask whether you agree with the privatization of the postal service” (Ohtake 
2003, p.123). However, it was his appealing performance and not his perseverance with his 
policy that resulted in a landslide win. The broadcasting of Koizumi’s orchestrated political 
show substantially increased the viewing audience. Inevitably, television deals with Koizumi’s 
political entertainment program (Ohtake, 2003, p.198–238). Any disadvantages Koizumi may 
have experienced by not belonging to the mainstream LDP were more than tempered by his 
unique performance and masterful use of mass media. Through his experience as a politician, 
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one could say that Koizumi naturally learnt how effective and significant the superstar effect 
could be in an election. Koizumi exploited television to purposefully play the role of a trickster 
in the political world to counter the traditional political forces relied upon by special interest 
groups. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The objective of this paper was to analyze the role of mass media in the formation of 
people’s support for charismatic political leaders, taking into account the superstar effect of 
political leaders. For this purpose, this paper dealt with the Koizumi regime, which held power 
for longer than any other regime in the past 25 years. The exceptional Koizumi is said to have 
shown simple logic and impressive performance in his effective use of the mass media when 
playing to the gallery. We carried out an empirical assessment by focusing on the influence of 
television viewing and reading newspapers on voters’ views about politics.  
Based on a survey conducted immediately after Koizumi’s landslide election win in 2005, a 
bivariate probit model was used for the estimation. The major findings are as follows. First, the 
frequency of watching television and reading newspapers is positively related to supporting the 
Koizumi regime while frequency is not related to the principal policy of the Koizumi regime. 
Second, the effect of watching television on support for the Koizumi regime is more significant 
and larger than that of reading newspapers. Third, after dividing the sample into men and 
women, the effect of watching television is only observed for women, whereas the effect of 
reading newspapers is observed only for men.  
Koizumi was not supported by the LDP’s institutionalized factional system or by special 
interest groups. Thus, it was necessary for him to use the media to compete with opponents 
that depended heavily on the system and interest groups. Our results imply that the charismatic 
leader’s playing to the gallery via television played a greater role than his policy in drawing 
support from female voters. This is partly consistent with the argument that by the media 
mixing political news and entertainment, it encourages passive voters to vote, acting as a 
counterbalance to special interest groups (Dyck et al. 2013). However, the effect of newspapers 
is no less robust and smaller than that of television even though more abundant information 
can be provided by newspaper than by television. Hence, an incredibly appealing performance 
by a political leader might have a greater effect on the outcome of election rather than 
information about his policy. Thus, the following argument can be derived: the superstar effect 
is an important factor in the opposition of small special interest groups. However, at the same 
time, special attention should be called for regarding the danger of populism.  
Since the advent of mass media, many charismatic political leaders have been seen to 
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effectively use the media to increase voter support. The media is seen to be especially useful to 
help “attractive” leaders increase their support level from the opposite sex. It is unknown 
whether such an argument is a generalization, and as such, it would be worthwhile to examine 
the issue using data from other countries. Furthermore, this paper made it evident that the 
televised images of a charismatic male leader influenced the views of female voters. However, 
it is unknown whether televised images of a female leader would influence male voters. That is, 
the question arises whether the effect is the same between sexes. In addition to these points, 
this paper only dealt with the effect of traditional mass media such as television and newspaper, 
which does not allow for interactive communication. In modern society, various types of 
interactive media (such as Twitter and Facebook) now exist and their influence cannot be 
ignored (Antoci et al. 2012; Sabatini and Sarracino 2014). Such modern interactive media is 
thought to affect people’s view about politics. However, research analyzing this effect is scarce. 
These issues remain to be addressed in future research. 
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(a) Men 
 
(b) Women 
Figure 1. Support for the Koizumi regime 
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(a) Men 
 
(b) Women 
Figure 2. Supporting privatization of postal service. 
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Table 1 
Duration of each regime (from 1989 to 2012) 
Regime  
Months 
 
Highest 
support rate 
(%) 
Lowest 
support rate 
(%) 
Uno  2 28 28 
Kaifu 27  56 35 
Miyazawa 21  54  20 
Hosokawa  8  71  57 
Hata  2  47  47 
Murayama 19  42  33 
Hashimoto 30  53 31 
Obuchi 21  49 23 
Mori 12  39   7 
Koizumi 60  85  39 
Abe (First regime) 12  65  29 
Fukuda 12  58  20 
Aso 12 49 15 
Hatoyama  9  72  21 
Kan 15  65  16 
Noda 15  60  20 
Average 17.3   
Source 
http://www2.ttcn.ne.jp/honkawa/5236a.html (accessed on April 26, 2014) 
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Table 2 
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variables 
 
Definition Mean 
KOIZUMI Value is 1 if respondent supports Koizumi regime, otherwise 0. 0.62 
PRIVAT Value is 1 if respondent supports the privatization of postal 
services, otherwise 0. 
0.42 
 TV 
 
Frequency of watching TV. 
1 (not at all)–5 (every day) 
 4.75 
  NEWS 
 
Frequency of reading newspaper. 
1 (not at all)–5 (every day) 
 4.38 
INCOM Household income (million yen) 
 
  5.22 
EDU Schooling years 
 
 12.5 
AGE 
 
Age  54.7 
 SPOUS Value is 1 if respondent has a spouse, otherwise 0. 
 
0.80 
CHILD 
 
Value is 1 if respondent has a child, otherwise 0. 
 
0.55 
UNEMP 
 
Value is 1 if respondent is unemployed, otherwise 0. 0.19 
KNOW 
 
Value is 1 if respondent knows that Yohei Kohno is the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives in 2005, otherwise 0. 
0.35 
GOVPT1 
 
Value is 1 if respondent supports the government party (the 
Liberal Democratic Party), otherwise 0. 
0.39 
GOVPT2 
 
Value is 1 if respondent supports the government party (the 
Komei Party), otherwise 0. 
0.03 
VILLAG 
 
Value is 1 if respondent lives in town/village, otherwise 0. 0.17 
MAN Value is 1 if man, 0 if woman. 
 
 0.53 
 24 
 
Table 3 
Determinants of supporting the Koizumi regime and the postal reformation 
(Bivariate probit model): full sample 
  (1) 
KOIZUMI 
   (2) 
 PRIVAT 
 (3) 
KOIZUMI 
   (4) 
PRIVAT 
 (5) 
KOIZUMI 
   (6) 
PRIVAT 
 TV 
 
0.03* 
(1.70) 
−0.01 
(−0.23) 
0.04** 
(2.49) 
−0.002 
(−0.10) 
  
  NEWS 
 
0.01 
(1.45) 
0.01 
(0.40) 
  0.02** 
(2.29) 
0.004 
(0.31) 
Ln(INCOM) 0.07*** 
(2.67) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
0.07*** 
(2.78) 
0.002 
(0.09) 
0.06** 
(2.59) 
0.001 
(0.07) 
Ln( EDU) −0.04 
(−0.61) 
0.20** 
(2.41) 
−0.03 
(−0.49) 
0.20** 
(2.47) 
−0.03 
(−0.54) 
0.20** 
(2.44) 
Ln(AGE) 
 
−0.14** 
(−2.49) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
−0.13** 
(−2.34) 
0.01 
(0.15) 
−0.14** 
(−2.51) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
 SPOUS −0.01 
(−0.17) 
0.02 
(0.50) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.53) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.46) 
CHILD 
 
−0.03 
(−1.09) 
0.01 
(0.21) 
−0.03 
(−0.99) 
0.01 
(0.23) 
−0.03 
(−1.18) 
0.01 
(0.27) 
UNEMP 
 
0.05 
(1.20) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
0.05 
(1.24) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(1.07) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
KNOW 
 
−0.01 
(−0.29) 
−0.03 
(−1.01) 
−0.004 
(−0.14) 
−0.03 
(−0.97) 
−0.01 
(−0.31) 
−0.03 
(−0.98) 
GOVPT1 
 
0.44*** 
(19.9) 
0.17*** 
(5.19) 
0.44*** 
(19.7) 
0.17*** 
(5.20) 
0.44*** 
(20.1) 
0.17*** 
(5.15) 
GOVPT2 
 
0.24*** 
(3.29) 
0.07 
(0.79) 
0.25*** 
(3.37) 
0.07 
(0.81) 
0.25*** 
(3.34) 
0.07 
(0.79) 
VILLAG 
 
−0.10**
* 
(−2.68) 
−0.04 
(−0.95) 
−0.10*** 
(−2.67) 
−0.04 
(−0.93) 
−0.10*** 
(−2.67) 
−0.04 
(−0.93) 
MAN −0.04 
(−1.28) 
−0.01 
(−0.14) 
−0.04 
(−1.26) 
−0.003 
(−0.14) 
−0.04 
(−1.25) 
−0.004 
(−0.12) 
Wald chi-sq 208 
 
205 
 
202 
 
Sample size 
 
858 858 858 
Numbers without parentheses show marginal effects. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics 
based on robust-standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, 
respectively. The constant is included but its result is not reported. 
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Table 4 
Determinants of supporting the Koizumi regime and the postal reformation 
(Bivariate probit model): sample of men 
 
 
Numbers without parentheses show marginal effects. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics 
based on the robust-standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, 
respectively. The constant is included but its result is not reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (1) 
KOIZUMI 
   (2) 
 PRIVAT 
 (3) 
KOIZUMI 
   (4) 
PRIVAT 
 (5) 
KOIZUMI 
   (6) 
PRIVAT 
TV 
 
0.002 
(0.88) 
0.002 
(0.07) 
0.04 
(1.57) 
0.01 
(0.39) 
  
NEWS 
 
0.02 
(1.44) 
0.01 
(0.78) 
  0.03* 
(1.91) 
0.01 
(0.88) 
Ln(INCOM) 0.06* 
(1.73) 
0.04 
(1.00) 
0.06* 
(1.85) 
0.04 
(1.09) 
0.06* 
(1.71) 
0.04 
(1.00) 
Ln( EDU) −0.01 
(−0.05) 
0.22** 
(2.04) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.23** 
(2.09) 
−0.004 
(−0.05) 
0.22** 
(2.04) 
Ln(AGE) 
 
−0.11 
(−1.24) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
−0.10 
(−1.08) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
−0.11 
(−1.22) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
SPOUS −0.08 
(−1.34) 
0.03 
(0.53) 
−0.07 
(−1.15) 
0.04 
(0.64) 
−0.07 
(−1.18) 
0.03 
(0.54) 
CHILD 
 
−0.01 
(−0.34) 
0.01 
(0.39) 
−0.01 
(−0.29) 
0.02 
(0.42) 
−0.01 
(−0.36) 
0.01 
(0.39) 
UNEMP 
 
0.05 
(0.95) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(1.02) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.05 
(0.90) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
KNOW 
 
0.02 
(0.49) 
−0.08* 
(−1.83) 
0.02 
(0.62) 
−0.08* 
(−1.76) 
0.02 
(0.40) 
−0.08* 
(−1.85) 
GOVPT1 
 
0.41*** 
(13.7) 
0.19*** 
(4.25) 
0.41*** 
(13.6) 
0.18*** 
(4.21) 
0.41*** 
(13.7) 
0.19*** 
(4.25) 
GOVPT2 
 
0.37*** 
(2.89) 
0.13 
(1.08) 
0.37*** 
(2.94) 
0.14 
(1.11) 
0.37*** 
(2.87) 
0.13 
(1.07) 
VILLAG 
 
−0.12** 
(−2.59) 
−0.06 
(−1.05) 
−0.12** 
(−2.54) 
−0.05 
(−1.00) 
−0.12**
* 
(−2.62) 
−0.06 
(−1.05) 
Wald chi-sq 116 114 
 
115 
 
Sample size 
 
455 455 455 
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Table 5 
Determinants of supporting the Koizumi regime and the postal reformation 
(Bivariate probit model): sample of women 
  (1) 
KOIZUMI 
   (2) 
 PRIVAT 
 (3) 
KOIZUMI 
   (4) 
PRIVAT 
 (5) 
KOIZUMI 
   (6) 
PRIVAT 
 TV 
 
0.04* 
(1.69) 
−0.01 
(−0.54) 
0.05** 
(2.16) 
−0.01 
(−0.68) 
  
  NEWS 
 
0.01 
(0.82) 
−0.004 
(−0.21) 
  0.02 
(1.51) 
−0.01 
(−0.46) 
Ln(INCOM) 0.09** 
(2.42) 
−0.04 
(−0.96) 
0.09** 
(2.47) 
−0.04 
(−0.97) 
0.09** 
(2.30) 
−0.04 
(−0.96) 
Ln( EDU) −0.10 
(−1.01) 
0.20 
(1.64) 
−0.09 
(−0.93) 
0.20 
(1.60) 
−0.09 
(−0.93) 
0.21* 
(1.68) 
Ln(AGE) 
 
−0.16** 
(−2.06) 
−0.04 
(−0.48) 
−0.15** 
(−2.04) 
−0.04 
(−0.49) 
−0.16** 
(−2.11) 
−0.04 
(−0.45) 
 SPOUS 0.03 
(0.68) 
0.02 
(0.39) 
0.04 
(0.78) 
0.02 
(0.36) 
0.03 
(0.72) 
0.02 
(0.37) 
CHILD 
 
−0.04 
(−1.03) 
−0.01 
(−0.28) 
−0.04 
(−0.95) 
−0.01 
(−0.31) 
−0.05 
(−1.16) 
−0.01 
(−0.19) 
UNEMP 
 
0.03 
(0.42) 
0.07 
(0.85) 
0.03 
(0.43) 
0.07 
(0.84) 
0.01 
(0.16) 
0.08 
(0.95) 
KNOW 
 
−0.07 
(−1.31) 
0.06 
(1.04) 
−0.06 
(−1.21) 
0.06 
(1.02) 
−0.06 
(−1.17) 
0.06 
(1.04) 
GOVPT1 
 
0.49*** 
(13.9) 
0.15*** 
(3.13) 
0.49*** 
(13.8) 
0.15*** 
(3.15) 
0.50*** 
(14.1) 
0.15*** 
(3.05) 
GOVPT2 
 
0.16* 
(1.87) 
0.02 
(0.20) 
0.17* 
(1.92) 
0.02 
(0.21) 
0.17* 
(1.91) 
0.02 
(0.21) 
VILLAG 
 
−0.07 
(−1.38) 
−0.01 
(−0.13) 
−0.07 
(−1.41) 
−0.01 
(−0.12) 
−0.07 
(−1.26) 
−0.01 
(−0.13) 
Wald chi-sq 117 114 
 
-466 
 
Sample size 
 
404 
 
404 
 
404 
 
Numbers without parentheses show marginal effects. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics 
based on the robust-standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, 
respectively. The constant is included but its result is not reported. 
 
 
